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1. F E D . R. CIV. P . 24(a )(2).
2. S ee Solid Wast e Agency v. Un ited S ta tes Ar my Corp s of Eng’r s, 101 F.3d
503, 507 (7th Cir. 1996); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F. 3d 1295, 1300 (8th  Cir. 1996); City
of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D. C. C ir . 19 94);
United  Stat es v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 19 85); Sou th ern
Chr i st i an Le ad er sh ip C on fer en ce v.  Ke lle y, 7 47 F .2d  777 , 77 9 (D. C. C ir . 19 84).
3. S ee Nor th wes t F ore st  Res our ce Cou nc il v. Glickman , 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th
Cir . 199 6) (h olding th at  in ord er t o have s ta ndin g “no specific legal or e quit able
interest  need be esta blished”); Associated Builder s & Contra ctors v. Perr y, 16 F.3d
688, 690 (6th  Cir. 1994) (holdin g th at  an  int erve nor does not have to have Article III
st an din g); Meek v.  Met ropolita n Da de Coun ty, F la., 985 F .2d 1471, 1480-81 (11th  Cir.
1993) (hold i n g t h a t  in te re st  gr ou ps  th at  la ck Ar ti cle I II  st an din g ca n i nt er ven e);
Pu rn ell v. Cit y of Akr on , 925 F.2d  941, 948 (6th  Cir. 1991) (holdin g th at  no specific
lega l or equ ita ble int eres t is r equir ed to in ter vene  as  of r ight, and t he applicant n eed
no t ha ve Ar ti cle I II  st an din g).
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Giving a H oot  About  an  Owl Does N ot Sat isfy th e
Int eres t Requ irem ent  for In ter vent ion: The
Misa pplica t ion of Int er ven t ion a s of Right  in
Coalition of Arizona/ N ew Mexico Counties for
S table Economic Growth v. Department of the
Int erior
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
Federa l Rule of Civil Pr ocedur e (FRCP) 24(a )(2) defines  the
in teres t  r equ i rement  tha t  is  necessa ry  in  order  for  an  app lican t
to int er ven e a s of righ t in p en ding li t iga t ion .1 The in terp re ta-
t ion  of t h a t  in ter est r equirem ent  ha s been t he su bject of great
dis p u te with in  the  fede ra l cou r t s . Unfor tuna tely,  the  Supreme
Cou r t  ha s n ot offered  mu ch gu ida nce in  th is a re a, a nd  th e few
Supreme Cour t  ca ses  tha t  a r e d ir ect ly on  poin t a r e  vague an d
have led t o th e deve lopme nt  of conflictin g ru les between  the
va r iou s fed er a l a pp ell a te cou r t s.  Som e circu i t s r equ i re tha t
poten t ia l in ter ven ors s a t is fy th e Constitu tion’s Article III
s t and ing requirements, 2 wh ile oth er s h ave  sugges ted tha t  an
inter venor need  only satisfy a significantly lesser  r equ i remen t ,3
includ ing in s ome cas es, a  mer e politica l int erest  in  the s ubject
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4. S ee Michiga n St at e AFL-CIO  v. Miller , 103 F .3d 1240, 1 247 (6th  Cir. 1 997).
5. S ee Edwar ds v. City of Houst on, 78 F.3d 983, 1004 (5th C ir . 19 96);
Mount ain  Top Condominium Assoc. v. Dave Stabber t Mast er Builder , Inc., 72 F.3d
361, 366  (3d C ir . 19 95); U ni te d S ta te s v.  Ne w Yor k,  820  F. 2d  554  (2d C ir . 19 87).
6. S ee Mi ller , 103  F.3 d a t 1 245-4 7; So l id  Waste Agency, 101 F . 3d at 506-07;
Coa lit ion  of Ariz. /N.M . Cou nt ies for  St ab le E con . Gr owt h v . De pa rt me nt  of th e
In te r io r , 100 F .3d 8 37, 8 40-41  (10t h C ir . 199 6); Mausolf ,  85 F.3d at 1300-02; Edwards
v. Cit y of Hou st on, 7 8 F .3d 9 83, 1 004 (5 th  Cir . 199 6); Mount a in  T op, 72 F.3d at 366;
Idaho Far m Bur eau F ed’n v. Babbitt , 58 F.3d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1995); United
Stat es v. Ge org ia,  19 F .3d 1 388,  1393  (11t h C ir . 199 4); Cit y of C lev e la n d ,  17 F.3d  a t
1517; Traveler s Indem . Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629, 638 (1st Cir. 1989); United
Stat es v. N ew  York , 82 0 F .2d  554  (2d C ir . 19 87).
7. 100 F. 3d  837  (10t h C ir . 19 96).
8. S ee Arizonan s for Official  English v. Ar izon a,  117  S. C t.  105 5, 1 067  (199 7);
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Un ited for Separa t ion of  Chur ch & State,
Inc.,  454  U. S. 4 64 (1 982 ).
ma tt er  of t he  su i t.4 The  rem ain ing circu its  fall some whe re in
between these two poles.5
Alth ough  every circuit claims to requ ire th at  th e proposed
in ter ven or  ha ve a legally protected i nt e r es t ,6 there is a
d iscrepancy between the circuits as to what constitutes a
“legally p rotect ed int e res t .” The case  of Coa li ti on  of
Arizona/ New Mexico Counties for S table Economic Growth v.
Department of the Interior7 is a pr ime exam ple of a federa l
circuit  cou r t  a llowing a n a pplica nt  to int erve ne a s of right  with
su bst an tia lly less t han  a tru e legally protected interest.
Cou nti es for Stable Growth  an d th e conflict bet ween  the  ci r cu i ts
i ll u st r a t e s wh y th e Supr eme Cour t sh ould provide a clearer
definit ion of wha t  cons t it u t e s a  p rot ect ed int e res t  under F RCP
24 (a )(2 ).  Al though  the Supreme Cour t  has  not  speci fi ca l ly
de fin ed  the m ea nin g of “pr otect ed  in ter es t ,” som e of t he Cour t ’s
decisions in dicate t ha t t he  Ten th  Circu i t ’s  s t andard  in  Cou nti es
for Stable Growth  is too permissive.8
Par t  II of th is N ot e discusses t he ba ckground of this issu e,
includin g other circuits’ rulings in intervention cases tha t
conflict  with  the h ol di n g in Counties for Stable Growth  and
Supreme Cour t  ca ses  tha t  a r e on  poin t,  including the Cour t ’s
recent  decision indicating tha t th e Court  is moving towards
req uir ing Art icle III st an din g for int ervenors . Par t III exa mines
t he fact s  and  the Ten th  Circu i t ’s  r eason ing in  Cou nties for
S table Growth .  Pa r t  I V a na lyzes  th is  case and  concludes  tha t
Art icle I I I s t and ing is th e ap pr opria te s ta nd ar d for det erm inin g
whet her  a poten tial in ter venor ha s a su fficient  i n te r est  in  the
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9. S ee F E D . R. CIV. P . 24(a )(2).
10. Id .
11. S ee, e.g., Don al ds on  v. U ni te d S ta te s, 4 00 U .S.  517  (197 1).
12. In  add it ion  to  these th ree requir emen ts, t he a pplicat ion mu st be  tim ely.
Bot h  part ies conceded tha t Dr. Silver, the a pplicant for interven tion  in  Cou nt ies for
St able Growth , ha d sa tisfied  th is re quir eme nt . S ee 100 F.3d at  840.
pending litiga tion  to int erve ne a s of righ t ,  and tha t  the
pr oposed in ter venor  in Cou nti es for Stable Growth did  not  have
a  sufficient legally protected  in teres t  in  the case  and s hould  not
have been per mit ted t o interven e because t he a pplicant  failed
to sa t is fy  any of the  th ree  requ irements9 necessa ry  for  an
app lican t  to in te rve ne  as  of right . F u r the rmore , t he  Ten th
Circu it’s st anda rd for  de ter min in g wh et her  an  app lica nt  ha s a
suffi cien t  inter est in  th e litigation t o interven e is not t he correct
s t anda rd the  federa l cour t s  s h ou ld employ becau se th e Tent h
Circu it’s liber a l len ien cy m ay viol a te t he Const it u t ion . Fin ally,
it  a l lows  too many  appl ica n t s t o inte rven e as  of right , put tin g
an  un ma na geable str ain on t he judicial system .
II. BA CK G R OU N D
FRC P 24 (a)(2) per mit s in te rve nt ion a s of righ t:
[W]hen  t h e  a p p li ca n t  claim s  a n  i n t e r e st  r e la t i n g  t o t h e
p r o pe r t y or  tr a n sa cti on  wh ich  is t h e s u bje ct o f t h e  a c tion  a n d
t h e a p p l ic a n t  i s  so sit u at ed  th at  th e d isp osit ion  of th e a ction
m a y  a s  a  p r a c ti ca l  m a t t e r  im p a i r  or  i m p e d e t h e  a p p li ca n t ’s
ab ilit y  t o  pro tec t  t ha t  i n t e re s t ,  un le s s  t he  app l i can t ’s  i n t e re s t
i s  adequa t e ly  r ep resen ted  by  ex i s t ing  pa r t i e s .10
Cour t s genera lly use a t hree pa rt  test  for det erm ining whet her
an  applican t sh ould be permitted t o inte rven e as  of right  in
federal  cour t s.11 Fir st , th e ap plican t m us t h ave a n in ter est  in
the lit iga t ion . Th is  in ter es t  requir em en t  is  the subject  of th e
cur ren t deba te b etw een  th e feder al a ppella te cour ts  becau se it
is not  specifically d efin ed  by R ule 2 4 or  Su pr em e Cour t
p receden t . Second, a  ru ling tha t is a dverse t o th e app lica n t
must  impair or impede the applicant ’s abili ty  to p rotect  the
interest. Thir d, t he a pplicant’s int ere st  mu st  not  be ad equ at ely
repr esent ed by the exist ing par ties. All three of these
requ i remen t s are necessar y  in  order  for  an  appl ican t  t o
int er ven e a s of righ t. 12
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13. U.S. CO N S T . art . III, § 1.
14. S ee Luja n v. D efen der s of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992); Valley F orge
C h ri s t ian  College v. Americans U nited for Sepa rat ion of Chur ch & Stat e, Inc., 454
U.S. 464 , 47 1 (19 82).
15. Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitt ed). This int er est  re qu ir em en t for
s t and ing is  t h e  st a n dard u sed for deciding issues of intervention in th e Seventh,
E igh th , and D.C. Circuit Courts. Those circuits apply the Article III s t and ing
requ ir emen t to poten tia l in t erve nor s. S ee Soli d Wa st e Age ncy  v. U ni te d S ta te s Ar my
Corps of Eng’rs, 101  F .3d  a t 503, 506 (7th Cir. 1996); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F .3d
1295, 1300-02 (8th  Cir. 1996); City of Cleveland v. Nu clear Regulat ory Comm’n, 17
F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United Sta tes v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d  855,
859 (7th Cir. 1985); Southern  Christ ian Lea dersh ip Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d
777, 779  (D.C . Ci r.  198 4).
16. S ee Lujan , 504 U.S. a t 560 (citin g Simon  v. Eas ter n Ky.  Welfare Righ t s
Org.,  426  U. S. 2 6, 4 1-42  (197 6)).
17. S ee id . (citing S im on , 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
18. S ee So l id  Waste Agency, 101 F .3d a t 5 07; Mausolf , 85 F.3d at 1300;  Cit y of
Cleveland , 17 F.3d at  1517; 36.96 Acres of Land , 745 F . 2d  a t 858; Kell ey, 747 F.2d
a t  779. 
19. S ee Car l Tobias , S ta nd in g to I nt erv en e, 1991 WIS . L. RE V. 415, 432-34
(di scuss ing th e few Sup rem e Cour t cas es dea ling spe cifically wi t h  the  is sue o f t he
interest  re qu ir em en t for  in te rv en ti on ).
Even  before in ter vent ion becomes  an  issu e, Art icle III of the
Unit ed St a tes  Const it ut ion l im it s t he  jur isdict ion  of federa l
cour t s t o “Cases ” an d “Contr overs ies.”13 A plain tiff wish ing t o
brin g an  act ion  in  feder al court  must  have Article III
st an din g.14 One must sa tisfy thr ee requirements in order  t o
have Art icle III sta ndin g. First , the pla intiff must  ha ve suffered
“an  ‘in ju ry  in  fact ’—an invasion of a legally protected interest
which  is concre te  an d pa rt icula rize d, a nd  ‘act ua l or im min en t,’
not  ‘conjectu ra l’ or ‘hyp oth et ical.’”1 5  Second , t he  in ju ry mus t  be
“fair ly t r aceable” to the  conduct  of the defendan t .16 Thir d, it
must  be “likely” tha t  th e a lleged in jur y will be r edr ess ed by a
favora ble ad jud ica t ion .17 Because Article III standing is the
s tandard for  dete rmin ing wh et her  a  pla in t iff m ay br ing  a  cause
of action in federa l cour t, some courts  ha ve suggested  t h a t
int erve nor s sh ould h ave t o sat isfy th at  st an da rd  as  well.18
The Supr em e Cour t  has on ly a dd res se d t he is su e of
i n te r vent ion as of right a few times,19 and th ose few cases h a ve
shed  litt le light on the necessary interest requirement . As a
re su l t, th e feder al cir cuit s a re  cur re nt ly split  on t he pr oper
stan dard for  dete rmin ing whether  an  app lican t  can  in tervene .
This  sp lit  of au thor it y ca uses confusion a nd n eeds to be
resolved by the Su prem e Cour t  in  orde r  to es tabli sh  a  un ifor m
inter pret at ion of th e FRCP 24 in ter est r equirem ent .
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20. S ee cases cited supra note 18.
21. 101 F. 3d  503  (7t h C ir . 19 96).
22. Id . at  507  (cit at ion s om it te d).
23. S ee Mausolf , 85 F.3d at 1295.
24. S ee City of Cleveland , 17 F.3d at 1515.
25. S ee North west F orest Resour ce Council v. Glickman, 82 F .3d 825 (9th Cir .
1996) (holding t ha t a n a pplican t n eed n ot posses s Art icle III st an ding  t o  int er ven e);
Associated  Builders & Cont ractors  v. Perr y, 16 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding th at
an  ap plica nt  ne ed n ot h ave  Art icle I II s ta nd ing  to i nt er ven e);  Meek  v . Met ropol it an
Dade Cou nt y, F la. , 985  F.2 d 14 7 (11t h C ir . 199 3) (hol d in g  t h a t  in te res t  g roups  tha t
la ck Art icle I II s ta nd ing  can  int er ven e); P ur ne ll v. C ity  of Akr on , 925 F.2d 941 (6th
Cir . 1991) (holding t h a t  n o specific legal or equitable inter est is requir ed to intervene
as of ri gh t,  an d t he  ap pli can t n ee d n ot h av e Ar ti cle I II  st an din g).
26. S ee Purnell , 925 F.2d at 948.
27. S ee Id ah o F ar m B ur ea u F ed ’n v. Ba bbi tt , 58  F. 3d  139 2 (9t h C ir . 19 94).
28. S ee Meek , 985 F.2d at 1471.
S om e of the federal appellate courts have established tha t
poten t ia l inter venor s  a s of right mu st ha ve Article III
st an din g.20 I n  it s  mos t  r ecen t  in t ervent ion case, Solid Waste
Agen cy v. United States Arm y Corps of En gineers,21 t he  Seven th
Circu it  followed  it s p recede nt  and d en ied  in ter ven t ion  as of
righ t  to an applicant who lacked Article III st anding. The cou r t
stat ed, “because intervention can impose substantial costs on
the pa rt ies a nd  th e judiciar y . . . by m akin g t he li t iga t ion  more
cumbersom e . . . , the  would-be in ter venor  will not be per mit ted
to push out t he already wide bounda ries of Article III
st an din g.”22 Recent ru lings in th e Eigh th  Circu it 23 an d th e D.C.
Circu it 24 have  es t ablished t he  sa me  ru le, ind icat ing t ha t
a l lowing one  to int e rvene withou t  Ar t icl e I II  st and ing v iol a te s
the  Cons t itu t ion .
Other  fed er a l a pp ell a te cou r t s h ave e st abli sh ed  more
re laxe d st anda rds  for  pot en t ia l in ter ven ors sim ilar  to t he  Ten th
Cir cu it  st andard  in  Counties for Stable Growth .25 The S ix th ,26
Ninth ,27 an d E levent h Cir cuit s28 ha ve all  specifically ru led th at
it  is n ot n ecessa ry for a n in ter venor  as  of right  to ha ve Art icle
III st anding t o su e. Beca use  of th es e s ign ifica n t ly differen t
a pproaches  to the n ecess a ry in ter es t  requ ir em en t  for
in ter ven t ion  as  of right , th ere  is a  confusin g lack of un iformit y
among th e circu its . The  Su pr em e Cour t s hou ld sp ecifically r u le
on  th is  is su e t o cla r ify t he d iscrep ancy a mong th e circuits by
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29. S ee Coalition  of Ariz ./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Departm ent
of In te ri or , 10 0 F .3d  837 , 83 9 (10 th  Cir . 19 96).
30. S ee id .
31. S ee i d . at 844.
32. Id . (al te ra ti on  in  or igin al ) (qu oti ng  App ell an t’s Ap pe al  at  25).
33. S ee id .
34. S ee 58 F ed . Re g. 1 4,2 48,  14, 252  (199 3).
35. S ee Silver v. Babbitt, 166 F.R.D. 418 (D. Ariz. 1994), aff ’d ,  68 F .3d  481  (9 th
Cir . 199 5).
36. S ee Counties for Stable Growth , 100 F.3d at 841.
37. S ee id. at 839.
38. S ee id .
39. S ee id .
prov id ing a  u n iform  sta nda rd for all federa l courts  to follow.
This Note provides an approach the Court should adopt.
III. CO A L I T I O N  O F  AR IZ ON A / N E W  M E X I C O  CO U N T I E S  F O R
S T A B L E  E C O N O M I C  GR O W T H  V . DE P A R T M E N T  O F  T H E  IN T E R I O R
A. Facts
In  1996, pu rsu ant  to FR CP  24(a )(2), com mer cia l wi ld life
photographer , Robin S ilver , sough t  t o int erve ne a s of right  in a
su it  brought  by a coalition of count ies again st t he Depa rt men t
of the I nt erior  (DOI) an d t he F ish  an d Wildlife Se rvice  (FW S). 29
The count ies  cha lle nged  the DOI ’s d ecis ion  to pr otect  t he
Mexica n  spot t ed owl u nde r  the E nda nger ed  Sp ecie s Act
(ESA). 30 Among other t hings, th e Coa l it ion  cla imed  tha t  the
DOI  had  not  only “failed to use th e best  ava ilable d at a” when  it
decided to place the owl on the t hreat ened species list,  but also
misa pplied the  da ta  tha t  it us ed.31 The Coa l it ion  sought  a
“‘pe r m a nent inju nct ion en joinin g [th e DOI ] from t ak ing a ny
act ions p ur su an t t o th e list ing of th e [owl]’”32 and an  order  tha t
the DOI remove the owl from th e threat ened species list.33
Silver had lobbied34 and s ucces sfu lly  su ed  the DOI  for  the
owl to be included on the t hreat ened species list.35 Silver relied
on 16 U.S .C. § 1540 (g)(1)(A), which  emp owers  citizens to sue
the DO I for in jun ctive r elief if it fails t o perform  its
nond iscre t iona ry duties.36 Silver sought t o intervene on the side
of DOI  in  the  coun t ies’ su i t.37 He  cla imed  an  in teres t  in  the
owl’s classification as a t hreat ened species.38 He also claimed an
int erest  in obs er ving t he  owl’s a est he tic bea ut y.39 Desp ite
Silver’s cla im s of a  legally  pr otect ed  in ter es t  in  the s ubject
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40. S ee id . It  is p ar ticu lar ly wor th  notin g th at  th e de fen da nt , th e DO I, d id n ot
wan t Silver to intervene, which supports the contention of this Not e  t h a t  t h e Article
III sta nda rd for  int erve nt ion h ar ms  no one  who is a lrea dy a p ar ty t o a law  suit . 
41. S ee id .
42. S ee id .
43. S ee id . at 846.
44. S ee id .
45. S ee id .
46. S ee 16 U .S. C. § 1 533 (b)(3) (1 995 ); 16 U .S. C. § 1 540 (g)(1) (1 995 ).
47. S ee Counties for Stable Growth , 100 F.3d at 841.
48. 16 U. S.C . § 15 40(g )(1)(A) (19 95).
ma tt er  of th e litigat ion, both  pa rt ies t o th e su it opp osed h is
app lica t ion  for  in ter ven t ion .40
The Unit ed S ta t es  Di st r ict  Cour t for th e Distr ict of New
Mexico denied Silver’s app lica t ion  to in ter ven e a s of r i gh t .41 The
dist rict  court  allowed S ilver t o subm it a n  a micu s cu r ia e br ief,
bu t  held t ha t h e lacked a s ubst an tial, legally protected int erest
in  the s ubject  mat ter  of the  li t iga t ion .42 However ,  on  appea l  the
Ten th  Circu it r ule d t ha t S ilver  could in te rve ne  as  of right .43
B. The Cour t’s  Reason ing
 In  Counties for Stable Growth , th e Ten th  Circu it  eval u a t ed
Silver’s application to intervene as of right and determ ined that
he ha d sat isfied all of the F RCP 24(a)(2) requirements. 44 The
cour t  began its an alysis by addressing whether Silver had a
di rect , su bst an tia l, and legally pr otecte d in ter est  in t he p end ing
lit iga t ion . It found th at  th ere were t wo reasons wh y Silver ha d
a  sufficient  int eres t t o satis fy the r equir emen ts of FRCP
24(a)(2).45
Fir s t , th e cour t r easoned t ha t becau se Silver ha d initia ted
the political an d lega l  processe s t o prot ect t he owl by su ing
FWS and DOI for fa ilur e t o design at e crit ical h ab ita t, t he
sta tu tes 46 empowerin g Silver to pur sue t hose courses  of act ion
also gave S ilver a  legally pr otecte d in ter est  in t he owl. 47 Those
st a tu tes  pe rmit  pr iva te cit izens t o “comm en ce a civil su it  on  h i s
own  beha lf . . .  to en join  a n y person, includin g the U nited
Sta tes  and a ny ot her  governmen ta l in st rumen ta lit y or
agency . . . , who is alleged to be in violat ion” of th e En dan gered
Species Act .48 Second, because Silver was  a wil dl ife
photographer , the court  reasoned that h is “‘de si re t o use  or
obser ve an  a n imal sp ecies, even for pur ely aesth etic pur poses,
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49. Cou nties for Stable Growth, 100  F.3 d a t 8 42 (qu otin g Lu jan  v. De fen der s of
Wildlife, 504  U. S. 5 55,  562 -63 (1 992 )). 
50. S ee id . at 844.
51. S ee id .
52. S ee id .
53. S ee id .
54. S ee id . at 845.
55. S ee id. at 846.
is undeniably a cognizable interest’”49 su ffi ci en t  t o allow h im to
int er ven e a s of righ t.
The cour t wen t on t o assert  th at  Silver’s int erest  would be
impa ired  if he wa s n ot a llowed to in te r v en e  a s of right .50 The
cour t  r easoned tha t  because a r uling adverse to Si lve r ’s p osi t ion
would  force  h im to submi t  a  new pet it i on for th e owl to be
placed on th e th rea ten ed species l ist , leaving the owl
un protected  in the  mean t ime , Silver’s int erest s would be
impaired.51 Thu s, t he cour t h eld tha t  Si lve r  sa t is fied  the s econ d
re qu ire me nt  for int er ven tion  as  of right .
The court  also held that Silver satisfied th e th i rd
requ i rement of FRCP 24(a)(2) because the  DOI d id  not
ad equ at ely represent Silver’s interests.52 The cour t  reasoned
tha t  because th e DOI must represent t he public’s in ter est , its
interest  may differ from Silver’s in teres t  in  main ta in ing  the owl
in  i t s na tu ra l ha bita t wh ere  he could  ph otogra ph  it. 53
Fu rt her more, because  the DOI  had b een  relu ctan t  to protect
th e owl in t he pa st, a s dem onstr at ed by the fact t ha t Silver h ad
to su e th e DOI for t he owl’s placement  on  the  th rea tened
species list,  there was a question  a s  t o whe th er t he D OI wou ld
zealou sly protect Silver’s interest.54 Becau se t he T ent h Cir cu it
deter mined  that  Silver had s a t i sfi ed  a ll  th ree  of the
requirements,  it  overruled the distr ict cour t a nd a llowed Silver
to int e rvene a s  of r i gh t .55
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Th e Article III Stan ding Requirem ents Should Be the
Proper Test for the Interest Requirement U nd er FRCP 24
1. Su preme Court precedent strongly indicates that Article III
stand ing is the proper standa rd
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56. Don ald son  v. U ni te d S ta te s, 4 00 U .S.  517 , 53 1 (19 71).
57. S ee Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holdin g a
pla in ti ff in fe der al cou rt  mu st  sh ow a n in vas ion of a  “lega lly p rot ected int eres t” in
order  to h av e Ar ti cle I II  st an din g).
58. 476 U. S. 5 4 (19 86).
59. S ee id . at 64-69.
60. S ee id. at 71.
61. S ee id .
62. 117 S. C t.  105 5 (19 97).
63. Id . at  1067 (quotin g Diamond, 47 6 U .S.  at  62).
64. Id .
In  the  fi r st  Supreme Cour t  case d ealin g wit h  the is su e of t he
int erest  requirement for intervention, the Court  held that t he
interest  req uir em ent st ated in FRCP 24(a)(2) was a
“sign ificant ly protectable interest,” which the Court defined as
an  in teres t  tha t  the  app lican t  cou ld cla im dur ing a  t r i a l.56 Such
a n  int erest  is an alogous t o the int erest  requ ired for Article III
st an din g.57 A few years  lat er, in  Diam o n d  v.  Ch ar les ,58 t he
Cou r t  he ld  tha t  in  order  t o appea l a  lowe r  fed er a l cou r t
de cis ion , any appe ll ant  mu st h ave  Art icle III s ta nd ing. 59
Because  of th i s r equ i rement , a  physician  in Diamond who
sought to appe a l a lower  court  decision r egar din g an  Illinois
abor t ion  law as  an  inter venor was  denied t he r ight t o appeal
because  he la cked Ar ticle I II s ta nd ing. 60 The impl ica t ion  of
Diamond is  tha t  wh ile  the in ter ven or  can  have all of t he  righ ts
of a  pa r ty to the  act ion  a t  t he t r ial level, he can not a ppeal
un less  he h as  Art icle III s ta nd ing. 61
Recen tly,  in  the ca se  of Arizonans for  Of fi cia l English v.
Ar izona ,62 t he  Supreme Cour t r eite ra ted  its  holdin g in
Diamond. The Court  stat ed, “[S]tan ding to defend on appeal in
th e place of an  original defenda nt , no less tha n st an ding to sue,
demands  that  the litigant  possess  ‘a  d irect  s t ake in  the
ou t come.’”63 However , th e Cour t in  Arizonans i nt e rpre t ed
Diamond t o mean  even  more . I t  s t a ted  tha t  “[t ]he  st and ing
Art icle III r equ irem ent s m us t be  met  by per sons  seek ing
appel la t e review, just a s it m ust  be met  by per sons  ap pea rin g in
cour t s of fi r st  instance .”64 The m ost nota ble segment  of tha t
s ta tement  is the reference to “persons a ppearing in courts of
first  in st ance,” be cause  tha t  ph rase , on  it s fa ce, e ncompa ss es
in ter ven ors as w ell  as p ar t ies  to the a ct ion . Th e log ica l
im pl ica t ion  of th is  st at em en t is  th at  int er ven ors m us t h ave
Art icle III s ta nd ing. Th is in dicat es t ha t t he fed era l ap pellat e
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65. The Su pr em e Cou rt  ha s n ot officia lly s ta te d t ha t in te rv en ors  a s of right
must  ha ve Art icle III s ta ndin g at  th e tr ial cour t leve l. However , th e im plica tion  of
Ar izonans is th at  if the Cou rt  were  to encoun ter  an  int erve nt ion  as of righ t cas e in
the futu re s uch a  holding m ight  logically follow.  This h oldi n g i s i n  li n e w it h  s om e
of the federal appellate courts.
66. Even  in t he a bsen ce of the Cour t’s most r ecent  int erpr eta tion  o f the interest
r equ ir emen t , t he  appl ican t i n  Counties for Stable Growth  faile d t o s a t i sf y a n y of t he
thr ee re qu ir em en ts  se t for th  by F RCP  24(a )(2).
67. S ee Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997); Valley
Forge  Ch ri st ian  Colle ge v. Am er ican s U nit ed for  Sep ar at ion o f  Ch u r ch & St at e, In c.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982). Howeve r, t hes e cases  ha ve not d irectly s p ok e n  on  the  ma tt er  of
the int eres t r equir emen t n ecessa ry t o inter vene a s of right .
cour t s th at  ha ve alr ea dy r equ ire d Art icle III s ta nd ing for
poten t ia l intervenors ha ve established the correct standa rd,
while  th e oth er cir cuit s, in cludin g  the Ten th  Circu i t , tha t  have
esta blished more lenient stan dards ha ve interpr eted Diam ond
too liber ally, a nd  th er efore, in corre ctly.65
The holding in  Arizonans is  pa r t icu la r ly s ign ifica n t  because
the Supr eme Cour t h ad n ot expres sly addressed the interest
requ i rement of FRCP 24(a)(2) since  it s  holding in  Diamond.
Because  the  Cour t  has  now indica t ed tha t  Diamond may  stand
for  the proposition th at int ervenors must h ave Article III
s t and ing to inter vene, cases t h a t  allow in te rve nt ion a s of righ t
with  a sh owing of an  inter est less t ha n t ha t pr escribed by
Art icle III may be struck down in the future. This suppor t s  the
argument  aga ins t t he T ent h Cir cuit ’s decision  i n Cou nti es for
S table Growth .66 Given the Supr em e  Cour t’s h olding in
Arizonans, i t  is likely t ha t Ar ticle III  st an din g will be th e ba sis
for  est ab lish ing t ha t a n a pplica nt  for int er ven tion  as  of right
ha s sat isfied the int erest  requ iremen t.
2. Problem s with  the Tenth  Circuit’s stand ard
 Besides mis ap plyin g Diamond,  t he Ten th  Ci rcu i t’s approach
to t h e int e res t  r equ ir emen t  for  i nt e rven t ion , a s  demons t r a t ed
by Counties for Stable Growth ,  is too lenient an d ma y lead to
severa l serious problems. First , Supreme Court decisions on
Art icle II I s t anding h ave indica te d t h a t  all litigant s in a case
should ha ve Art icle III st an din g,67 and by allowing litigant s to
inter vene wit h ou t  tha t  s t and ing , federa l cour t s  viola te the
Con st it u t ion . Second , by allowin g more applicant s to int ervene
as of right  in lit igat ion, t he cou r t s a re op en in g t he d oor  for
longer t r i a ls  and fewer  set tle me nt s beca us e int er ven ors h ave
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68. S ee Solid Wast e Agency v. Un ited Stat es Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d
503, 508  (7t h C ir . 19 96).
69. S ee Dia mo nd  v. C ha rl es , 47 6 U .S.  54 (1 986 ).
70. S ee cases cited supra note 18.
71. 85 F.3d at  1300.
72. Id . (quotin g Valley Forge , 45 4 U .S.  at  475 -76).
a l l of the privileges t h a t pa rt ies to th e action ha ve.68 Thus,  an
in ter ven or  ca n  b u rden  th e lega l syst em  by pr even tin g a
se t t lement  or  pr olon gin g a  t r ia l. Th is  runs cou nter  to one of the
p r imary pur poses of inter vent i on ,  which  i s to reduce  the
b u rdens on  the  cour t  sys tem and  to reach  a  fina l deci sion  in
cases by a llow in g a ll p a r t ies  wh o have a legally protected
interest  t o pa r t icipa t e  in  the liti gation. Third, because
in t e rvenor s ar e given wh at  am oun ts  to pa rt y st at us  at  th e tr ial
level, it seem s inconsisten t t o deny them  th e right  to inter vene
on appea l  un less they can  show a  grea ter  in teres t  than  was
necessa ry to g ive them in t e rvenor  s t at us a t t ria l. This
incons is tency ar ises because Diamond established Article III
st a n d in g as t he r equirem ent  for a n int ervent ion on appea l69
while  some circuits have a more lenient st andar d for
in ter ven t ion  at th e trial level. Because  t h e Ten th  Ci rcu i t’s
s t anda rd causes ser iou s problems, it is clear tha t Article III
s t and ing is the on ly wor kable  st anda rd for  in ter ven t ion  as of
r igh t .
a. The Constitutional issu e of adju dicating m atters
involv ing non-Art icle III parties. Th e Seve nt h, E ight h, a nd
D.C. Cir cu its h ave each adopted Article III standing as th e
interest  requ ir em en t  a  pot en t ia l in ter ven or  mus t  demons t r a t e
in  orde r t o int er ven e a s of righ t. 70 In  Mau solf v. Babbitt,  t he
E ighth  Circu it, r elyin g  on Su prem e Court  precedent , sta ted
tha t  Art icle  II I l im it s ju dicia l power  to cases an d cont roversies
and serves  as a n  unyielding rest ra int on jud icial power. 71
Fur thermor e , th e Mau solf court  stat ed, “an Article III case or
cont roversy, once joined  by int er ven ors w ho la ck st an din g,
is—put  blun tly—n o longer  an  Art icle III ca se or  contr overs y”
because “‘[t ]hose  wh o do n ot  pos se ss  Art . II I s t anding m ay n ot
litiga te  as  sui tors  in  the courts  of the United  St at es.’”72 Thus,
un der  the Eighth Circuit’s i n terp ret a t ion  of t he  Supreme
Cour t ’s holding in  Val ley  Forge Ch ri st ia n  Col lege v . Am erican s
for S epa ra ti on  of Church  an d  S tate,  not  on ly mus t  a  poten t ia l
in ter ven or  ha ve Article III stan ding in order  to inter vene, if he
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73. S ee Ari zon an s for  Offici al  En glis h v . Ar izon a,  117  S. C t.  105 5 (19 97).
74. S ee South ern Ch ristia n Lead ersh ip Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779
(D.C. Cir . 19 84).
75. C ity of Cle vela nd  v. N ucl ear Reg ulat ory Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C.
Cir . 199 4).
76. S ee id .
la cks Article III sta ndin g but is n everth eless a llowed  to
inter vene, the  federa l cour t s  no longer  have the  author i ty  to
hea r t he case.
If th i s in terp re tat ion  of Valley Forge—which  is  suppor t ed by
the recen t  Supreme Cour t  ru l ing  in  Arizonans73—is a ccur at e,
then  the cir cu it s t ha t  pe rmit  in ter ven t ion  as of right based on  a
showing of less than Article III stan d in g a re  viola t ing  the
Con st it u t ion  an d exceedin g th e power  th at  is confe r red  to them
by Art icle III of th e Const itu tion . This  is certainly the most
se r ious p rob lem wi th the Tenth Circuit’s current sta ndar d for
dete rmin ing whether an  applicant  has a su fficient interest to
inter vene, an d  t h is problem can only be overcome by eith er
tak ing the r adica l s t ep  of modi fyin g t he Const it u t ion  or, less
ra dically,  by ad optin g Article II I st an din g as th e standa rd for
intervenors.
The D.C. Circuit also requires th a t  int erve nor s h ave Ar ticle
III st an din g.74 Tha t court  ha s st at ed th at  “because a  Rule 24
in ter ven or  seeks t o pa r t icipa te  on  an  equa l  foot ing with  the
origina l pa rt ies t o th e su it, h e mu st  sa tis fy the  st an din g
requ i remen t s imposed on those parties.”75 Fur the rmore , the
cou r t  agreed with t he Eighth Circuit and su ggested that
a llow in g someone to intervene with less of an interest tha n
Art icle II I s t anding wou ld  viola te t he Const i tu t ion  because the
cour t s would be exceeding th eir powers conferred t her eby.76
Ther efore,  a l l int erve nor s m us t h ave Ar ticle I I I s t and ing , or  the
cour t  tha t  a l lows them t o intervene under a  lower standa rd  has
viola ted  the Const it u t ion .
b. The i n efficiency and h igh cost of the Tenth Circuit
stand ard . The  Seven th  Circu it h as  also adopted the Article III
s t anda r d and ha s stat ed that  “because intervention can impose
subs tan t ia l cos t s  on  the  pa r t i es  and  the jud icia ry,  not  on ly by
making th e litigation m ore cumber some but  a lso (and m ore
impor t an t ) by blocking sett lement , . . . the would-be
intervenor[s] wil l n ot  be  pe rmit t ed  to pu sh  out  the already wide
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77. Solid Wast e Agency v. U nit ed St at es Arm y Corps  of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503,
507 (7t h C ir . 19 96) (ci ta ti on s om it te d).
78. United  St at es  v. 3 6.9 6 Acr es  of La nd , 75 4 F .2d  855 , 85 9 (7t h C ir . 19 85).
79. S ee id . However, because th is case pre-dated Lujan , “i t  is  conce ivab le  tha t
the group would have been held to have sta ndin g.” So l id  Waste Agency,  101  F .3d  a t
508.
80. Diamond v. Cha rle s , 476 U.S. 54, 62  (1986) (quoting Valley F orge Ch rist ian
College v. Am er ica ns  Un it ed for  Se pa ra ti on of C hu rch  an d Stat e, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
473 (198 2); S ier ra  Clu b v.  Mor ton , 40 5 U .S.  727 , 74 0 (19 72) (c it a t i ons  omi t t ed );  and
United  St at es  v. S CRAP , 41 2 U .S.  669 , 68 7 (19 73)).
81. S ee id . a t  61-62 (arguing th at only those with Art icle III standing ha ve real
stak es in the out come of a case sufficient to esta blish a real  case or  con tr over sy).
Although  associations or organizations ma y have sta nding to sue,  th is is only t ru e if
bounda ries  of Article I II  st and ing.”77 Because  of the gr ea t  cost s
t h a t  i nt e rvenor s  impose on  the  jud ici a l sys t em and  the pa r t ie s
to a case, the Seventh Circuit has in some cases required  tha t
an  int e rvenor  have  an  in t e res t  “g rea ter th an th e interest
su ffi cien t  to sa tis fy th e st an din g req uir em en t.”78 In  add it ion ,
the Seventh  Circuit declined to allow an environment al group,
whose claim ed a est he tic a nd  envi r on m ent al in ter est s in
pend ing litiga tion  wer e an alogous t o th e int ere st s of Silver in
Cou nti es for Stable Growth , to inter vene because th ey lacked a
di rect , su bst an tia l, an d lega lly prot ected  int ere st  in t he
lit iga t ion .79  Given th e alrea dy hea vy case load t ha t federa l
cour t s ha ve, any ru le tha t will alleviate some of tha t bu rden
while  imp rovin g judicia l int egr ity by e limin at ing t he
ad judica tion  of ma tt ers in volving par ties wh o lack Art icle III
stan ding should be welcomed by the courts.
c. The inconsistency of giving intervenors party statu s at
trial lev el, b u t d enying them  th e righ t t o ap pea l. Supreme
Cou r t  pr ecede nt  de n ies  in ter ven ors w ho la ck Art icle III
s t and ing th e r ight  to a ppe al ju dgm en ts  by t he d istrict courts.
The Supreme Cour t  s t a ted  in  Diamond:
“Th e ex er cise  of jud icia l pow er  . . . can  so p ro fou n dly  a ffect  th e
l ives , l i be r ty ,  and  p rope r ty  o f  t hose  to whom i t  ex t en ds ,” th a t
t h e  decis ion  to s ee k r evie w m u st  be p la ced  “in t h e h an ds  of
those  w h o  h a v e a  d i r ec t  s t a k e  in  t he  ou t come.”  I t  i s  no t  to  be
p laced in t he  ha nd s of “conce rn ed b yst an der s,” wh o will u se it
sim ply  as  a “ve h icle for  th e vin dica tion  of va lu e in te re st s.”80
Thus, the Suprem e Court  indicates th at  only those who ha ve a
di rect  st ak e in t he  out come of th e cas e, or  in  other words,
Art icle I II  st and ing, 81 sh ould be p erm itt ed t o app eal in  a
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th eir  members  wou ld have s t andi n g in t heir  own r ight . S ee Arizonan s for Official
English v. Ar izon a,  117  S. C t.  105 5, 1 068  (199 7).
82. S ee Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62.
83. S ee Coalition  of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Departm ent
of the I nter ior, 100 F.3d 837, 839  (10t h C ir . 19 96).
84. S ee supra Par t IV.A.1.
85. S ee Ar izonans, 117 S. Ct. at 1055.
86. T h e Fede ra l Rules of Civil Pr ocedure  include  th ese goals  am ong t heir
p r imary pur poses. S ee F E D . R. CIV. P . 1.
87. S ee Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans U n ite d for  Sep ar at ion of
l awsu it . Diamond exp lici t ly for bid s a n  in ter ven or  from
appea l ing the outcome of a case unless t h e  in t ervenor  has
Art icle III  st an din g.82 In  Cou nties for Stable Growth , Silver
sought to appeal the outcome of the case as a n  in t e r venor ,
based  on  the  cl a im tha t  it  was e r ror  for  t he  di st r ict  cou r t  t o
deny him t he r ight t o interven e.83 Under  Diamond, t h is  act ion
should  n ot  have made it t o court un less Silver had Article III
st an din g, and careful ana lysis reveals that  he lacked Article III
st an din g.84
Because one  of the  fundamenta l  r igh t s of the  Amer ican
judicia l sys t em i s t he r ight t o appeal, it seem s un fair to den y
tha t  right to an intervenor who has been given part y status a t
t r i a l. One logical solution t o this dispa ra te t rea tm ent is  to
requ ir e those  wh o in ter ven e a s of r igh t  to have Ar t icle III
st an din g. By req uir ing Article III st an din g, int erve nor s a re a ble
t o appea l an d h ave  all of th e pr ivileges of a p ar ty t o t he
lit iga t ion . The only other a ltern at ive to this solut ion would be
for  th e Supr eme Cour t t o overru le Diamond. However , th is
seems un likely given the  Supreme Cour t ’s  s t a tements
regard ing Art icle III st an din g in Arizonans.85 Requ irin g th at  a l l
in ter ven ors a s  of r ig h t  h ave Article III standing provides the
advan tage tha t  cour t s  wil l not  be over ly bur den ed by ext ra
par ties  who could n ot sue on  their  own  because  they l ack a
suffi cien t  inter est in  th e subject ma tt er of the litigat ion. This
re su lt p rom otes  th e goals  of jud icial econom y an d efficiency.86
Fu rt her more, it i s difficult t o un der st an d h ow a cour t could
read Diamond as a llowin g in ter ven t ion  of an  appl ica n t  who
la cks Art icle III st an din g at  th e t ria l level, wh ile den ying t he
same appl ican t  t he r igh t  t o i n terven e on a ppea l. This  is
pa r t icu lar ly tr ue in light  of a pr evious Su preme Cour t  holding
in  Va lley Forge where  the Cour t  s t a ted  tha t  on ly those  who
have Art icle III st an din g ma y litiga te in  the federal court s.87
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Church  & St at e, I nc. , 45 4 U .S.  464 , 47 5-76  (198 2).
88. Id . at 476.
89. S ee Ellyn  J . Bullock, Acid  Rain  Falls  on  the  Jus t  and the  Unjus t : Why
S tan din g’s Criteria S hould  Not b e Incorporated in to Int ervention  of Righ t , 1990  U. ILL .
L. RE V. 605; Tobias , supra no te 19, at 415.
90. S ee Bullock, supra note 89, at  606-08.
The Cour t  wen t  on  to s t a t e th a t  establishing Article III
s t a n d in g “is not merely a troublesome hur dle to be overcome if
possible so as to reach the ‘merits’ of a lawsuit which a par ty
desires  to have ad jud ica ted; i t  is  a  pa r t  of t he basic chart er
p r omu lgated  by the  Framers  of the  Cons t itu t ion .”88 Given th e
holding in Va lley Forge, an d t he in consist ent  res ult  t h a t  is
achieved unde r  the Te nth  Cir cuit ’s in ter pr et a t ion  of Diamond ,
it  is clear t ha t t he T ent h Cir cuit  an d t hose ot her  circuit s wit h
similar st andar ds have erred.
Because  of these  th ree significan t pr oblems with t he Ten th
Circu it’s cu r rent  s t a nda rd for  de ter min in g wh et her  one ca n
in ter vene as  of r igh t ,  it  shou ld reeva lua te  the s t andard and
adopt th e Art icle III s ta nd ar d em ployed by t he  Seven th , Eigh th ,
and D.C. Circuits. The Article III sta nda rd r esolves all thr ee
p rob lems by allowing int ervenor s to appeal, reducing the costs
of litiga tion  by permitt ing fewer interventions, and most
impor t an t ly , avoiding Constit ut ional violations. F ur th erm ore,
the Article III sta nda rd a ppear s to be more congru ous wit h  the
few Su pr em e Cour t  de cis ion s t ha t  rela te t o the s ubject  of th e
in te res t  r equ ir emen t .
3. Criticism of requiring Article III stand ing for intervenors is
un founded
 Some lega l  com m e n t a t ors have criticized court s that  have
est ablis hed  Ar t icle  II I s t anding a s t he s t anda rd n ecess ary for
in ter ven t ion .89 The th rus t  of th i s cr i t ici sm i s tha t  r equ ir ing
Art i-cle III s ta nd ing for in ter venor s will preclude man y interest
groups, espe cially environm ent al group s, from b eing in volved in
law  suits.90 While it is probable  t h a t  Art icle III st an din g will
preclude ma ny int erest  groups from int ervenin g, this concern
pales  i n  compar ison  to the  a sser t ion  tha t  cou r t s  a r e v iol a ting
t h e Con st it u t ion  wh en  they p er mit  in ter ven t ion  by a pp lica n t s
who lack Article III sta ndin g. On th is point, “[t]he Supr eme
Cou r t  h a s often em ph as ized t ha t a  laws uit  in feder al cour t is
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91. Mau solf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 12 95, 1301 (8th Cir . 1996) (citing Valley Forge ,
454 U. S. a t 4 73).
92. Coalition  of Ariz. /N.M . Cou nt ies  for S ta ble E con. G row th  v. De pa rt me nt  of
the Inte rior, 100 F.3d 837, 843 (10th Cir. 1996).
93. S ee id . at 842.
94. 504 U. S. 5 55 (1 990 ).
95. S ee Counties for Stable Growth , 100 F.3d at 841-42.
96. Id . at 842 (quoting Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d  727, 735 (9 th  Cir . 19 91),
over ru led  by Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117  S. Ct. 1055 (1997)). The
fact  t ha t  Yniguez was  over ru l ed  fu r the r  suppor t s  t he  argumen t  t ha t  Cou nt ies  for
St able Growth  is bas ed on flawe d rea sonin g.
not  a  forum for  the a ir in g of in ter es ted  onlook er s’ concerns,  nor
a n  ar en a for p ub lic-policy deba te s.”91 The  Const itu tion  sh ould
not  be for saken  in  favor  of specia l in teres t  g roups  who have an
interest  in t he lit iga t ion , bu t  who do not  sa t is fy  the
Con st it u t ion a l r equ ir em en ts t o lit iga te in  the fede ra l cou r t s.
B. S il ver  Lack ed  a S u ff icien t I n terest  in  th e Lit iga ti on
 In  ana lyzing Silver’s interest  accordin g to th e Art icle III
s t and ing req uir eme nt s, t he s hor tcomin gs of the  Ten th  Circu it’s
reason ing become a ppa ren t. This section will demonst ra te t he
ana lysis th at  th e Ten th  Circu it s hou ld h ave u sed in  Cou nti es
for Stable Growth  by applying th e sta nda rds  set forth  above.
1. Previ ous v iew in g and  ph otogr ap hy of  th e owl d oes n ot
sa ti sf y t he in terest  requirem ent
 F i rs t , S il ve r  a ss e r t ed  t h a t  h e “ha [d] stu died a n d
photograph ed th e Owl in  th e wild.”92 The court found  th is to be
an inter est s ufficient t o satisfy even th e Article III sta ndin g
requ i rement and , a s  such ,  clea r ly s u fficient to sa tisfy its lower
s t anda rd for  in ter ven t ion .93 Th e Ten th  Cir cu it  reli ed  on the
Supreme Cour t’s h olding in  L u j an  v. Defend ers of Wildlife94
when  it  made  th is  de ter min a t ion .95 The Tent h Circuit  rea soned
tha t  “‘because  the Ar t icle  II I s t anding r equir em en ts a re m ore
s t r ingen t  t han  those for inter vention u nder  ru le 24(a), [the]
det erm ina tion  that  [the applicants] ha ve st an din g un der  Art icle
III compels the conclusion that t hey have an adequate interest
un der  th e r ule .’”96
While the proposition tha t one who satisfies the interest
requ ir ement for  Ar t i cle I I I s t and ing  au tomat ica l ly  sa t i sfi es  the
interest  requ ir em en t  to in ter ven e a s of r igh t  is  correct, Silver
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97. S ee Luja n v . Defe nd er s of Wild life, 5 04 U .S. 5 55 (19 92); Counties for Stable
Growth , 100 F.3d 837.
98. S ee Lujan , 504 U.S . at 555.  Article III stan ding requ ires a pla intiff to show:
first,  he has suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest w h ic h  i s imminen t ,
concrete,  an d p ar ti cul ar ized ; se cond , a  cau sa l con ne cti on b et wee n t he  cond uct
complained of and t h e  in j u r y;  t hir d, l ik eli hood t ha t t he  in ju ry  wil l be  re dr es se d if t he
pla in ti ff pre vails in  court . See supra  Part  II.
99. Id . a t  562-64.
100. Id . at  564  (em ph as is i n o ri gin al ).
101. S ee id .
102. S ee id . at 561.
103. S ee id. at 560-61.
104. Coa lit ion  of Ar iz./N .M. Cou nt ies  for S ta ble E con. G row th  v. De pa rt me nt  of
the In te ri or , 100  F. 3d  837 , 83 9 (10 th  Cir . 19 96) (e mp ha sis  ad de d).
did  not  sa t is fy  the in teres t  r equ i rement for Art icle III  st an din g.
The Ten th  Cir cuit ’s m is in ter pr et a t ion  of Lujan  is str ik ing
espe cially given that t he facts in the two cases a re vir tu ally
iden tica l.97 In  Lujan , an  envir onm en ta l int er est  grou p sou ght
an  injunction t o compel th e Secreta ry of the Int erior to res tore a
form er  in terp re tat ion  of an  envir onm ent al r egula tion , ma kin g it
applicable  to foreign businesses.98 The Su prem e Court  declared
tha t , wh ile “the  des ire  to u se or  obser ve an  an imal species, even
for  pu rely es th etic pu rp oses, is  undeniably a cognizable interest
for  pu rp ose of sta nd ing,”99 t he  pla in t i ffs  lacked s tandin g t o sue
because  th e group’s repr esent at ives failed to show tha t t hey
had “concret e p la ns,  or  in de ed  eve n  any sp ecifica t ion  of when”
th ey would s eek t o observe t he t hr eat ene d sp ecies in
ques t ion .100 The  rep res ent at ives of th e en vironm ent al gr oup
claimed  th at  th ey ha d viewed  th e en da nger ed sp ecies in t he
past  and  tha t  th ey int ended t o go to see th e species again, bu t
th ey fa i led to demons t ra te tha t  they had  any concre te t r avel
plans.101 The r equirem ent  th at  a claimed in jury be concrete,
part icularized, and  imminen t  is  necessa ry to suppor t  a  finding
of actual injury which is one of the th ree elements of Article III
st an din g.102 The Cour t  in  Lujan  concluded tha t  p rev ious t r ip s  t o
view th e th rea ten ed specie s  a lone we re  not  su fficien t t o give
p la in tiffs  a legally protected in ter est s ufficient for Article III
st an din g.103
Desp ite  th e virt ua lly iden t ica l  fact s  in  Counties for St able
Growth , th e Tent h Circuit  foun d th at  because Silver h ad
claim ed th at  “he had  ph otogra ph ed a nd  st ud ied t he O wl in t he
wild,”104 he had a n interest  sufficient for Article III s t a ndin g.
This  conclusion conflicts wit h t he h olding in  Lujan . According
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ C O F -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
811] COALIT ION  OF ARIZ ONA  v. DOI 829
105. S ee Lujan , 504 U.S. at 564.
106. Cou nt ies  for Stable Growth, 100 F.3d at 839.
107. Id .
108. Id . at 841.
109. S ee i d .
t o Lujan ,  absen t  a  showing tha t  Silve r  had concre t e p lans  to
p h otograph  an d view the owl at  a specified time in t he fut ur e,
he would have lacked Article III st and ing .105 Such  p lans  were
never demonstr ated.
While  it is  possible, p erh ap s even  likely, t ha t S ilver wou ld
seek  to view and ph otograph  th e owl again, th e Tent h  Cir cu it
based  its  decision t o allow Silver to inter vene as  of r i gh t  and  it s
as ser tion  that  he had Article III sta n d in g  on his past
experiences which is complet ely incons is tent  with  Lujan .
Furt her more,  Silver would have su bst an tia l difficult y
demons t ra t ing a  causa l con nect ion  between  the Coalit ion  of
Count ies’ claim tha t th e DOI “failed to follow  proper p rocedures
and lacked sufficient data s u fficien t  to l is t  the Owl  as
th re at en ed,”106 and t he im pa ir men t  of his  pe r son a l  interest.
This  is because Silver’s interest was in th e owl itself, while the
su it  conce rned  the da t a used  to p lace th e owl on t he t hr eat ened
species list.  Thus, Silver lacked Article III sta ndin g because th e
Ten th Circuit m isapp lied the Lu jan  s t andard in  Cou nti es for
Stable Growth ,  a  case with  a  v ir tua l ly  iden t ica l  fact  pa t t ern .
2. T he stat u te em pow ering S il ver  to seek  an  in ju ncti on  to p la ce
th e owl on  th e th rea ten ed  sp ecies  li st  does n ot qual if y S il ver
to intervene as of right in Counties for Stable Growth
 T h e second r ea son  tha t  the Ten th  Cir cu it  ga ve for  a l lowing
Silver to intervene wa s th at  “he was  inst rumenta l in  the FWS’s
init ial  de cis ion  to pr otect  th e Owl.”107 The  court  specifically held
“tha t  Dr. S ilver’s in volveme nt  with  th e Owl in  th e wild a nd  his
persist en t  r ecord  of advocacy  for  i ts  p rot ect ion  amoun t s  t o a
di rect  and su bs tan t ia l in ter es t  in  the li st in g of t he Owl for  the
purpose of inte rve nt ion a s of righ t.”108 Th e  cou r t  bas ed t his
de cis ion  on  the  fa ct  tha t 1 6 U.S .C. § 1540 a llows pr ivat e
citizens  to su e t he fed er a l gove rnmen t  for v iola t ion s of t he
En dan gered  Sp ecie s Act . First,  § 1540(g)(1)(C) gives citizens the
r ight  t o comm ence a civil suit against th e DOI if it  fails to
per for m  i t s n on -d is cr e t ion a r y du t ies .1 0 9  In  ad dit ion,
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110. S ee id . at 841-42.
111. S ee id . at 842.
112. Mau solf v. Babbitt , 85 F.3d 1 295, 1300 (8th  Cir. 1996) (citing Ma rbu ry v.
Mad ison , 2 L.  Ed . 60  (180 3)).
§ 1540(g)(1)(A) gives citizen s t he r ight  to comme nce civil su i ts
on  their  own beha lf to enjoin an y person, governmen t
ins tr um en ta lity,  or  agen cy wh o is  alle ged t o be violat ing t he
Endangered  Species  Act .110
This  analysis is problematic on several grounds. First,
t aken  to the ext rem e, u nde r  th is  ana lys is , a nyon e and  everyone
would  be pe rm itt ed t o int er ven e a s of righ t in cases  dea l ing
with  thr eatened species simply because th ere are sta tut es tha t
give p r iva te ci t izens  the r igh t  to su e t he gover nmen t  for
noncompliance with  the  E n dan gere d Sp ecies Act. This  would
lead  to a  subs tan t ia l b u r de n  on  the ju dicia l sys tem  in  ter ms of
t ime an d m oney. P er ha ps on e could a rgu e tha t  S ilve r  was
a llow ed  to int e rvene because h e sued t he governm ent  un der
§ 1540, wh ile oth ers  who h ad  not  ta ken  sim ilar  legal a ct ion
would  be  pr eclu de d fr om in ter ven in g. H owever , even  wi th  tha t
caveat,  t he  cour t ’s  a n a lysis is still flawed because S ilver no
longer has  a  righ t  to su e u n les s t he DOI  is  not  in  compl ia nce
with  th e En da nger ed Sp ecies Act. Thu s, if as t he T ent h Cir cuit
has suggest ed, one can sa tisfy the in ter est  r equ i remen t  t o
inter vene as  of right  based on t heir r ight t o sue,111 Silver no
lon ger  ha d t ha t r ight  an d t her efore lack ed a  su fficient  int er e st
to int e rvene a s  of r i gh t . Fu rt her mor e, as  th e Eigh th  Circu it  has
sta ted , “Congress  cou ld no more  use  Rule 24 to abroga te the
Art icle III  st an din g re qu irements  than  it  cou ld expand  the
Su pr em e Cour t’s origina l jur isdict ion by st at ut e.”112
Second, t he  Ten th Circuit’s an alysis is pr emised on t he idea
tha t  an a pplicant’s previous legal involvement wi th  th e subject
ma tt er  of a  pe nding su it  is  su fficien t  t o g ive tha t  appl ican t  a
present  legally pr otecta ble int ere st  th ere in.  However ,  there  a re
numerous instances wher e t h is  wou ld  be  pr oble mat ic. F or
examp le, a  husband  who li t igates th e division of pr opert y in a
divor ce se t t lem en t  in  wh ich  h is  wife  was  given  thei r  r ea l
p roper ty could in te rve ne  as  of right  in s ubs equen t  lit iga t ion
involving easements or other  disput ed inter ests  in th e propert y
even though  he  no longer  has  any ownersh ip  in  t he  pr oper ty.
While  Silver  clear ly ha d a  legally pr otecte d in ter est  in pu tt ing
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113. S ee 16 U .S. C. § 1 540 (g)(1) (1 995 ).
114. S ee Counties for Stable Growth , 100 F.3d at 844.
115. In  fact , ev en  if incor r ect, the DOI’s implement ation of its procedures aided
Silver by resulting in t he owl being placed on th e thr eaten ed species list , whereas a
proper  implem ent at ion ma y not h ave led t o the  sam e res ult .
116. F E D . R. CIV. P . 24(a )(2).
t he owl on the t hreat ened species list as demonstrat ed by h is
§ 1540 su it , t her e is  no in dica t ion  tha t  once th e owl was pla ced
on the list Silver maintained a legally pr otecte d in ter est  in
keep ing it on the list.113 To put  it s imp ly, th e righ t t o sue in  th e
past  should n ot itself give one the r i gh t  to int er ven e a s of righ t
in  the  pre sen t .
3. The principal  su i t in  Counties for Stable Growth  was over
the accuracy of the data, while Silver’s interest was in the
owl itself
 Fin ally,  alt hou gh Silver ’s in ter est  was  in t he owl i ts elf, the
d ispu te between t he DOI an d th e Coalition of Counties wa s
over the  da ta  tha t  the  DOI used to de ter min e whet her  to place
the owl on  the  th reatened species list.114 While a  ru l ing  tha t
was a d ve r se  t o the DOI ’s p osi t ion  wou ld  have h ad t he effect  of
rem oving th e owl from  th e t hr ea te ne d sp ecies list , th e owl was
not  th e subject ma tter of the litigation, rather it  was th e
ad min ist ra tive  procedures  th at  th e DOI used . Becau se Silver
was neither a  part y adversely affected by the DOI’s
im plem en ta t ion  of i t s p rocedures115 nor  an  agen t of the  DOI, h e
lacked a  lega lly  pr otect ed  in ter es t  in  a  challenge t o the DOI’s
implem ent a t ion  of its own pr ocedur es. Thus , even if Silver
could have  es t ablished a  legally pr otecte d in ter est  in t he owl,
he lacked a legally protected int ere st  to int erve ne a s of right  in
t h e litigat ion between t he Coalition of Count ies an d th e DOI
because  the owl wa s n ot  the s ubject  of the li t iga t ion .
C. S ilver’s Interest Would N ot Be Impa ired if He Was N ot
Al lowed  to In tervene
 Alth ough  the la st  two e lement s of FRCP 24(a)(2)116 a r e not
the focus of th is Note, th e cour t a na lyzed th ese elem ent s in
ad dit ion to the  in t e res t  r equirem ent  in det erm ining whet her  to
per mit  Silver’s int ervent ion. The cour t det erm ined t ha t Silver
also sat isfied the second elemen t  necessa ry for  an  appl ican t  t o
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117. S ee Counties for Stable Growth , 100 F.3d at 844.
118. S ee id .
119. Id .
120. S ee id .
121. S ee generally Atl an ti s D ev.  Cor p. v . U ni te d S ta te s, 3 79 F .2d  818  (5t h  C ir .
196 7).
i n te rvene as  of right  becau se h is in ter est s would  be imp air ed if
he was not allowed to inter vene in th e case between t he DOI
and th e Coalit ion of Coun tie s.1 1 7  The  cour t  r easoned tha t  i f the
coun ties  were successfu l in  ga in ing  an  in junct ion , th e owl would
be removed from th e Endangered Species List . As a r esu lt,
Silver  would have to reap ply with bett er da ta  to have th e owl
pu t back  on th e list , leavin g  t h e owl un pr otecte d in  th e
mea nt ime.118 Fu r thermore , t he cou r t st at ed th at  “th e stare
decisis effect  of the d is t r ict  cou r t ’s  judgment  is  su ffi cien t
imp air me nt  for int er ven tion  un der  Rule  24(a)(2).”119
Even  as su min g  th a t  the s ta re d ecisis effect of a poten tia lly
adverse judgmen t  is  a  su fficie n t  im pa ir men t  of an  app lica n t ’s
interest  to a llow th e a pplica nt  to in te rve ne  as  of right , it is
unclea r  tha t  ther e would  be  su ch  an  effect  i n  t h is  case.  If the
dist rict  cour t  dete rmined tha t  the DOI failed to use the best
ava ilable  da ta  an d m isa pplied  th e da ta  it used  when t he DOI
decided to place the owl on t he t hr eat ened sp ecies list, Silver
would not be precluded from r eapplying t o have th e owl placed
on the list again by showing different da ta t h a t  s a tisfied the
requ i r emen t s of 16 U.S.C. § 1540.120 Thu s, a n a dver se r ulin g
would  not  imp air  or pr event  Silver  from s ubs equ ent ly
pr omotin g his in ter est  in pr otectin g th e owl.
The fact  tha t  an  adverse judgment  would mean  the owl
would  be tem porar ily unpr otected does not  mea n S ilver’s a bility
to subsequently prot ect  th e owl by a gain  going t hr ough  th e
proper  ad min ist ra tive  an d, if ne cessa ry, lega l chann els wou ld
be impa i red . T h u s, Silver has  not sa tisfied th e second elem ent
of FRCP 24(a )(2 ).  When  a  cou r t  r u l es  t ha t  a  pi ece  of p roper ty
belongs  to one pa r t y t o a  su it  be tween  two p ar t ies  in  wh ich  a
th ird pa r t y  a lso claim s a n own er sh ip in te re st  to t ha t p rope rt y,
s t a r e decisis is a serious consideration because th e third part y
has no recourse  i f the  cour t  has  ru led tha t  the pr oper ty be longs
to an  or iginal  pa r ty.121 However, it is significantly different
when an  app lica n t , like S ilver , wi ll h ave l ega l r ecour se t o
pursue his interests regardless of the ou tcome of t he li t iga t ion
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122. S ee Counties for Stable Growth , 100 F.3d at 845.
123. S ee id .
124. Id . at  845; cf. Soli d Wa st e Age ncy  v. U ni te d S ta te s Ar my  Cor ps  of En g’rs,
101 F.3d 503 , 508 (7th C ir. 1996) (holding tha t a m ere showing th at a  government
ag en cy is represen ting both public and pr ivate inter ests  is  not enough to establish
inadequate re pr es en ta ti on  wit ho ut  a s ho win g of conf lict  bet wee n t hos e pu blic a nd
pr iva t e interests).
125. S ee Counties for Stable Growth , 100 F.3d at 845 .
126. S ee id . (relying on Trbovich v. United Mine Work ers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972);
Sier r a  Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 1994); Mille Lacs Ban d of Chippewa
Ind ians v. Minn esota , 989 F .2d 994 (8t h Cir . 1993)). 
127. S ee T rbov ich , 404  U.S . at  528; Sierra Club , 18 F .3d a t 1 202; Chipp ew a
in  which he seek s to int ervene. In  essence, th e Tent h  Circu it
has ru led th at  th e potent ial inconvenience to Silver was a
suffi cien t  en ough  im pa ir men t  of h i s i n tere st s t o allow him  to
inter vene in Counties for Stable Growth ,  despite the opposit ion
to h is  in ter vent ion  by b oth  or igina l par t ies t o the s u it . A m e re
in conven ien ce should not be considered a su ffi cien t  impa i rment
of one’s int erest  to would sat isfy the second element  of FRCP
24(a)(2).
D. S ilver’s Interest Was Adequately Represented by the DOI
 T h e Tenth Circuit also determined th at Silver sat isfied t he
th ird requir em en t  of FRCP 24(a)(2) beca us e  h is  in t e res t s  were
not  adequ at ely repres ent ed by the DOI.122 The cour t  s t a ted  tha t
it  was  imp ossible for t he DOI t o adequa tely repr esent  Silver’s
interests  because the DOI  wa s s eekin g t o pr otect  the p ubli c’s
interest, n ot  t he pr ivat e int ere st  of Silver an d oth ers  like
h im.123 The court a sser ted t ha t in in sta nces wher e th e
govern men t  is trying to represent i ts  own in teres t s a s  we ll  a s
those of privat e ind ividua ls, su ch a  “conflict” alone s at isfies t he
“min imal burden” of sh owing a  lack  of adequa te r epresen ta t ion
for  intervention purposes.124 Fur the rmore , because the DOI  had
been r e luct an t  t o p r ot e ct  the owl, a s e vid en ced  by t he fa ct  tha t
Silver  had t o su e t he DOI  in  orde r  to pr otect  the owl, t he cou r t
believed th at  th e DOI’s pas t r eluctan ce made it s pres ent
rep res en ta t ion  of Si lve r ’s in ter es t s e ven  more s usp ect .125
Once again , the court ’s an alysis is flawed. The cou r t  r elied
on severa l cases when  it det erm ined t ha t Silver ’s  in t e res t  was
not  adequ at ely repres ent ed by the D OI.126 Those ca ses a ll held
tha t  the interests of va r ious a pplicant s for int ervent ion were
not  adequa tely r epresen ted by the  government .127 However ,
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128. S ee cases cited supra note 127.
129. S ee Counties for Stable Growth , 100 F.3d at 844.
each  of those  cases  is  d is t ingu ishable  from Counties for St able
Growth  becau se t hey d ealt  with  int erve nor s wh o ha d economic
interests  t ha t  we r e s ubs t an t ia lly  di ffer en t  from  the
govern men t’s interests 128 while S ilver claim ed no econom ic
i n te rest  in th e litigation betw een t he Coalition of Count ies a nd
the DOI. Silver’s interest was kee pin g the  owl on  the
th rea ten ed species list,  which was the same interest embr aced
by th e DOI . The  DOI w as  defen din g a s u it  t h a t  a l leged i t  had
failed to use the best available data and m isapplied the dat a  it
used  when it decided to pu t t he owl on the t hr eat ened sp ecies
list.129 Thus , the DOI would be seeking to defend the dat a tha t
it  used  a n d it s a pp lica t ion  ther eof in  orde r  to ke ep  the owl on
the th rea ten ed species list, which is exactly th e sam e in t e r est
tha t  Silver  posses sed. Be cau se Silver ’s u ltima te in te res t  was
also in keepin g the owl on th e th reatened species list,  these
in t e res t s ar e iden tica l for th e pu rp ose of deter min ing t he
adequacy of repr esent at ion in th is case. The DOI would seek  to
have i t s d a t a an d procedur e appr oved by th e cour t in ord er t o
keep  the owl on  the li st , a nd t hus i t  is  di fficu lt  to se e h ow
Silver’s inter ests  were n ot adequa te ly represent ed by the DOI.
Fu rt her more, because  Si lve r  did n ot  have an economic interest
in  the  owl—tha t  was conflictin g with  th e DOI’s inte res t—it  is
difficult  to unders tand  how h is inter est would n ot be
ad equ at ely represented given tha t it  was the sa me as the DOI’s
interest. Becau se Silver ’s in ter est  would be  ad equ at ely
repr esent ed by the DOI, he also failed to sa t is fy  the  th ird
neces sa ry elem en t  of FR CP  24(a )(2).
V. CO N C L U S I O N
 In  Coa li ti on  of Counties, th e Ten th  Cir cuit err ed when  it
a llow ed  Silver to int erve ne. Th e pr oper t est  for det erm inin g
whether  an  app lican t  ha s a su fficient , legally protected  interest
in  pen din g litiga t ion  to in ter ven e s hould  be  ba se d on  the
interest  r equ i rement for  Ar t i cle I I I s t and ing . Th is  is  the
s t anda rd th at  ha s alr eady been a dopted by some of the federa l
appel la t e cour t s . Th is  s t andard  p u ts  in te rvenors  on  an  equa l
level with  t h e par ties t o a case, increases  judicial economy by
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ C O F -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
811] COALIT ION  OF ARIZ ONA  v. DOI 835
r educing the nu mber of interventions, and ensur es that  the
delicate sepa ra tion of powers est ablished  by t he Const it u t ion  is
not  u pset by t he judiciary exceeding its Art icle III power.
Fu rt her more, the Article III standa rd appears  to be cons is tent
with  th e Su pr eme  Cour t’s h oldings in  sever al cas es in dir ectly
add ress ing th is par ticular  issue.
Und er  th e Art icle III st an din g requ iremen ts , Silver clea rly
lacked a sufficient interest  in  the  li t iga t ion  between  the
Coa lit ion  of Coun tie s a nd  th e DOI . He  als o failed t o sat isfy th e
Ten th Circuit’s lower standa rd for  eva lua t ing  whe ther  an
app li can t ’s in ter es t  is  su fficient  to  intervene as  of r ight .  Not
only did S ilver  lack  a s ufficient  legal ly p rotected  in teres t  in  the
lit iga t ion , he a lso failed to sa tisfy the oth er t wo requirem e n ts
tha t  ar e necessar y for one t o interven e as  of ri ght  pu r suan t  t o
FRCP  24(a)(2). B eca use  Si lve r  did n ot  sa t is fy a ny of t hose
requirements,  his  ap plica t ion t o inte rven e as  of right  sh ould
have been den ied. The Supreme Cour t s hou ld sp ecifically de fine
the proper standar d for  dete rmin ing whether  an  in te rvenor  has
a  sufficient in ter est t o interven e as of r igh t  and  clea r  up  the
confusion  an d dis agr eem en ts  th at  exist  am ong th e circuits. If
and when  it  does,  the Cour t  shou ld fol low the Seven th ,  Eigh th ,
and D.C. Circuits and esta blish Article III standing as th e
st anda rd by which th e inter ests  of applican ts for int erven t i on
are evaluated.
R odrick  J . Cof fey
